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LINER SHIPPING AND THE U.S. INTERNATIONAL TRADES
by
Fredrick M. Collison, Ph.D.
University of Hawaii at Manoa

INTRODUCTION
Over the past few years liner shipping has undergone a number
of changes which have been particularly important in the U.S.
international trades. These changes have affected shipping lines,
shippers, consignees, and intermediaries, who have had to modify
the way in which they operate in order to be successful. This article
will discuss some of the more important changes that have taken
place, the impact that they have had on the industry, and what this
means for shipping lines and their customers.1
The international liner industry serving the U.S. consists of two
types of shipping lines - conference lines and independents, with
both regulated economically by the Federal Maritime Commission
(FMC). Conference lines belong to voluntary organizations, whose
members jointly agree on the rates to be charged and the services to
be provided by member lines, and may include the determination of
sailing schedules and ports of call.2 A number of these Conferences
are found in the U.S. trades and are given anti-trust immunity to
make these joint decisions regarding rates and service. Conferences
in the U.S. trades are required to be "open," which means that any
line wishing to join cannot be arbitrarily denied membership.
Independent lines operate outside the conference system making
management decisions on an individual basis and frequently com
peting against the conference lines.
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Among the recent and continuing changes that have affected the
international liner industry in the U.S. trades are:
*

implementation of the Shipping Act of 19843;

*

passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of
19884;

*

increased development and sophistication of intermodal
services;

*

evolution of round-the-world services;

*

overcapacity on many U.S. international trade routes.

These changes represent both problems and opportunities for both
shipping lines and their customers. Those who adapt to these
changes will be successful. The following sections highlight the most
prominent features of these changes and the impacts that they have
had on the U.S. international liner trades.

RECENT U.S. SHIPPING LEGISLATION
Shipping Act of 1984
The Shipping Act of 1984 has resulted in a number of major
changes in U.S. international iiner shipping. This legislation took a
somewhat different direction than did most other contemporary
legislation that dealt with economic regulation of transportation.
While nearly all other legislation of the last decade resulted in some
form of deregulation, the Shipping Act of 1984 seemed to increase
liner shipping's exemption from anti-trust considerations.5 At the
same time, however, the power of shippers in relation to liner con
ference operators was also increased.
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Since the Shipping Act of 1984 is quite comprehensive, only the
most relevant provisions will be dealt with here.6 These are:
* A clear authority for conferences and their shipping line
members to offer intermodal rates and services;
* The right for individual conference members to take
independent action on 10-days' notice on any rate or service
action required to be filed in a tariff;
* Service contracts with specific rate schedules and service
guarantees may be negotiated in which a shipper commits a
minimum amount of cargo over a specified period of time,
with independent action on service contracts only available to
conference member lines when the conference permits;
* Carriers or conferences are prohibited from refusing to deal
with shipper associations.
The above provisions created a number of changes in the relation
ships between shipping lines and their customers. The first three
provisions listed above resulted in much more flexibility in the
negotiation of rate and service changes on the part of the liner
conferences and their individual member lines serving the United
States.
The provision of the Act which permitted conferences and their
members to offer intermodal service has been quite important,
because there had been legal questions about conference authority
in this area. Prior to 1984, shipping line conferences were hesitant
to establish intermodal services for fear of violating U.S. antitrust law.
As a result of the Shipping Act's intermodal provisions, the number
of intermodal services have increased dramatically, as discussed
below. In order to preserve the prevailing environment of domestic
transportation regulation, however, the Act specified that overland
rates and terms of service by rail or highway were required to be
individually negotiated between a shipping line and an overland
carrier.
Volume I, Number I
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The use of service contracts between shippers and conferences/
individual shipping lines has become an important result of the
Shipping Act. A service contract provides a vehicle for negotiating
transportation arrangements such as rates, terms of service, and
shipper commitment of cargo between the two respective parties.
Generally, shippers with large volumes of cargo and/or regularly
scheduled shipment needs are in the best position to negotiate these
contacts with shipping lines. In some cases, service contracts are
possibly dominating scheduled liner services such as in the Japan to
U.S. trades, where it is estimated that more than 80 percent of liner
cargo moves under service contracts.7
The Act's inclusion of independent action on tariff rates by
individual conference lines has also provided a method for increas
ing the degree of competition in the U.S. international liner trades.
Under these provisions, any conference line can establish their own
rate separate from one filed in a conference's tariff on 10-days'
notice. This situation will often lead to individual shipping lines filing
rates under independent action that are below the conference's
tariff. This can lead to lower transportation costs for those shippers
whose cargo moves under independent action rates. The use of in
dependent action has grown over the last couple of years. As an
example, in April, 1988, the liner members of the Asia North
America Eastbound Rate Agreement took over 2,400 independent
actions, more than in all of 1987.8
Decisions by the FMC within the last year, however, are begin
ning to place limits on individual liner flexibility for determining rates
and services under the Act.9 The FMC has banned the use of
changes to service contract rates based on verbal quotes a shipper
may have received, known in the industry as “Crazy Eddies."10
Instead, the only justification for modification to a service contract
rate is the publication elsewhere of a rate in a tariff or other service
contract below the existing contract rate. An additional pricing
constraint on shipping lines under consideration by the FMC is to
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bar rate changes from a published tariff after cargo is in transit,
known as pocket rates, in order to prevent undermining of filed tariff
rates.
Another decision by the FMC allows conferences to ban
independent action by their members on loyalty contracts whereby
a lower rate may be available to a shipper who makes a specific
minimum cargo commitment. Previously, mandatory independent
action was available to individual conference lines on loyalty
contracts. Mandatory independent action still exists on normal rate
or service items filed in a conference's tariff which are available to all
shippers. The above actions and decisions, if fully implemented, will
probably result in increased rates paid by some shippers who are
using conference lines for their liner shipping needs.

Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988
This recent international trade bill deals not only with general
trade issues but also specifically with discrimination by foreign
governments against U.S. liner operators. With regard to shipping,
the intent of the legislation is to increase the power of the FMC to
deal with unfair conditions affecting U.S. flag shipping.11 The
legislation changes the regulation of liner shipping in areas such as
the inclusion of intermodal activities as subject to investigation and
remedy, a wider range of penalties available to the FMC, a shorten
ing in the length of an investigation of alleged discrimination, and
subpoena power for the FMC to obtain critical information.12
As a result of the powers given to it by the 1988 Act, the FMC
has proposed new sanctions against foreign lines (in addition to
those previously available) to include:
* limits on sailings or volume or type of cargo carried to U.S.
ports:
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* suspension of agreements relating to preferential terminal
arrangements;
* space chartering, or pooling of cargo or revenues in
intermodal service;
* fines of up to $1 million per voyage;
* requests to the U.S. Customs Service and/or Coast Guard to
deny vessel clearance or entry.13
The proposed sanctions, which may be adopted in their entirety or
modified before final implementation, will potentially give the FMC
much greater power to control unfair shipping practices.

CURRENT LINER SERVICE DEVELOPMENTS
Intermodalism
Intermodal liner services have continued to grow over the last
few years, not only in the U.S. international trades but on other liner
service routes as well.14 Intermodal service in the U.S. international
trades today consists of three basic forms as follows:
* microbridge, in which overland transportation between an
interior point and a port is coordinated with ocean
transportation;
* minibridge, in which a segment of an all-water ocean
transportation movement is replaced by an overland
movement to/from an intermediate port;
* landbridge, in which coordinated land transportation is
substituted for a mid-portion of an all-water ocean
transportation movement.15
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In order to develop an efficient and effective intermodal service,
a number of key elements must be in place. A shipping line must
have coordinated services with carriers in one or more land-based
modes of transportation. In the U.S., intermodal ocean service is
available in coordination with both rail and highway carriers to/from
many interior points. The ocean carrier must possess an adequate
pool of equipment in the form of containers, chassis, container
cranes, and container-handling equipment. A smooth flow with
minimal delays must be accomplished in vessel discharge and
loading as well as in cargo flow in the terminal area. Finally, a
computerized control system is critical in the functioning of the inter
modal system to ensure a high level of service.
Today, many shipping lines in the U.S. international liner trades
offer intermodal service. Although pioneered by carriers such as
American President Lines (APL) and Sea-Land Services (Sea-Land), a
number of foreign lines also offer similar types of service. As an
example, APL provides an intermodal service which includes a
computerized information system that includes single transaction
capability and integrated rail and highway transportation with a
network of over 130 terminals throughout North America.16 SeaLand also offers a highly developed intermodal system which
includes overland rail and trucking services to much of the continen
tal United States.17
A key component of intermodal liner service in the U.S. trades is
the development of intermodal rail, and to some extent, trucking
services. Rail service, known as container on flat car (COFC), is used
for longer distance overland movements while trucking is generally
used for shorter distance movements. In some cases, the intermodal
rail service is operated by a shipping line with the actual line-haul
rail service provided by contract between the shipping line and a rail
carrier. In other cases a railroad may provide the service which is
available to any shipping line that wishes to use the service. The
railcars used in the service can be owned by either the shipping line
or the railroad.
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One of the most recent developments in intermodal rail service
is the use of double-stack trains where the containers are carried two
high. These services result in lower transportation costs because
more containers can be carried with a reduction in the weight of the
rail cars and only a small increase in the number of engines and rail
crew size. The growth of these services has been rapid (see Table
1); thirty weekly eastbound double-stack services in 1986 increased
to ninety-six in 1987. The weekly TEU capacity was over 38,000 in
1987, up from 18,000 in 1986.18 It has been estimated that in 1987
double-stack cars accounted for approximately thirty-five percent of
all container miles carried by rail, up from virtually zero in 1983.19
The two largest double-stack lines for both frequency and
capacity were American President Lines and Sea-Land. Nearly every
other double-stack service was operated by a foreign-flag line or
other type of carrier. The origins and destinations for these services
are found in Table 2. Los Angeles, Seattle, and Long Beach are the
principal eastbound ports on the U.S. west coast for double-stack
service and the first two show the largest growth between 1986 and
1987. The principal destinations are Chicago and New York, both
with large growth between the two years. In nearly every case, the
double-stack trains serving New York also provide service to
Chicago.
As intermodalism has grown, the nature of the service provided
has also changed. The size of containers has been growing with
lengths increasing from forty feet to forty-five and then to forty-eight
feet. Container heights have increased from 8.0 feet to 8.5 and 9.5
feet. Most recently, containers of fifty-three feet in length have been
introduced by APL. Some of the new containers introduced by APL
and others have been initially intended for domestic service only.
Thus, the intermodal liner services are no longer confined to just
international transportation but are also extending the overland
portion of the transportation movement to also include the domestic
market.
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TABLE 1
EASTBOUND DOUBLE - STACK TRAINS FROM
U.S. WEST COAST BY CARRIER

1986

1987
Carrier

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

17

8,830

8

3,480

Sea-Land

8

3,920

7

2,800

K Line

4

1,240

1

400

Maersk

2

1,120

1

560

NYK

5

1,060

1

400

OOCL

2

660

1

360

MOL

1

480

1

400

Evergreen

2

400

—

...

Hanjin

1

400

...

—

HJCL

1

400

...

...

YS Line

2

260

...

...

J Line

2

200

...

...

NOL

1

200

...

...

—

—

2

700

American President Lines

U.S. Lines
VO-MTO's3
Totals

48

19,000

8

9,110

96

38,170

30

18,210

aVessel operating multimodal transport operators
Sources: Adapted from Review Of Maritime Transport 1987 and 1986.
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TABLE 2
EASTBOUND DOUBLE - STACK TRAINS BY ORIGIN
AND DESTINATION

1987a
West Coast Origin

1986a

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

Weekly
TEU
Frequency Capacity

Long Beach

9

3,700

6

2,300

Los Angeles

22

8,600

7

2,800

1

560

1

400

Oakland
Portland

1

300

—

—

Seattle

9

3,320

2

1,080

Destination15

Chicago

35

14,150

17

7,000

Cincinnati

2

560

1

200

Columbus

5

1,360

1

400

Memphis

7

2,480

1

400

New York

2

7,780

8

3,500

Houston/Dallas

7

2,020

2

760

New Orleans

1

460

2

760

Atlanta

8

3,900

2

700

aVessel operating multimodal transport operators (VO-MTO's) not included.
bMany stack trains operate to more than one destination; frequencies and
capacities cannot be summed.
Sources: Adapted from Review Of Maritime Transport 1987 and 1986.
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In order to tie an intermodal and international transportation
system together, many shipping companies have implemented
sophisticated computer systems for management and control. As
with intermodalism itself, APL and Sea-Land have been the innova
tors for these computerized systems with Eagle Data Access and SeaTrac, respectively. These computer systems, and others like them,
provide for shipper/consignee access to electronic booking and
tracking of intermodal cargo, vessel schedules, container equipment
access, and vessel space status as well as computer generation of
required documentation,20 all of which benefits a line's customers.
More recently, Sea-Land has developed a system known as Sea-Pay
in which the freight billing and payment are handled electronically.21

Round-the-World Liner Service
A fairly recent development is the reimplementation of roundthe-world (RTW) liner service, in which vessels sail in only one
direction rather than on a route serving one geographic region.
Only a limited number of ports are served with cargo from outlying
areas brought to the load center ports by either feeder vessels or
overland carriers. Overland transportation may be an intermodal
service or a more traditional non-integrated service. Although a
recent development, RTW service existed previously in the more
traditional liner trades. For example, APL had such service up until
the late 1970's, although that service did not match the current
services since it handled primarily break-bulk cargoes.
The innovators in the new RTW services were Evergreen
Shipping of Taiwan and U.S. Lines of the United States.22 Both
services started in 1984 and were gradually brought up to a sailing
schedule of weekly service from the selected load center ports.
Evergreen started and continues to operate their service in both
eastbound and westbound directions between the Far East, North
America, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Mideast. U.S. Lines'
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service was only in an eastbound direction covering the same basic
service areas as Evergreen. In late 1986, U.S. Lines filed for bank
ruptcy and the vessels of the RTW service were sold.
More recently, other lines such as Senator Line have started
RTW service while Evergreen has expanded its service. In most
cases these services use large vessels with limited numbers of ports of
call. RTW services have generally required large, regular volumes of
cargo in order to be profitable, given the high levels of vessel,
operating, and start-up costs. Since these services may not provide
as high a level of service as those of intermodal carriers, the rates a
RTW liner service can charge are often lower than those for intermo
dal service.23 The success that Evergreen in RTW service can
partially be explained by the fact that they offer intermodal service in
conjunction with the RTW service. The number of lines offering
RTW service continues to be much more limited than those offering
intermodal services, indicating that there may not be a high level of
shipper demand for this service.

Vessel Size
Containerization in the liner trades led to the development of
new vessel designs in order to take advantage of the new transporta
tion technology. The initial vessels, however, were often small and
in many cases converted from existing vessels not designed for
containerization, thus creating inefficient container ships. More
recently, however, container vessels have increased in technological
sophistication to better use the technology of containerization as
well as the more recent intermodal liner services. The increased
sophistication has put pressure on shipping lines to reduce operating
costs which has led to an escalation of container ship sizes.24
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Newer containerships are now routinely above 2,500 TEU
(twenty-foot equivalent length containers) capacity with lengths of
800-900 feet and more. As of mid-1988, nearly forty percent of the
world container fleet was of more than 2,500 TEU capacity, while
ninety-two percent of the capacity to be added by mid-1990 is of
this size.25 Container vessels on order or placed in service since the
beginning of 1987 or currently out for bid will add approximately
397,000 TEU to the world fleet.26 Characteristics of some recent or
projected containerships are found in Table 3. Of particular note is
the APL C-10 class vessel with a beam of over 129 feet. This design
represents a break with tradition since these vessels cannot transit
the Panama Canal where the maximum beam is 106 feet. All other
existing vessels listed in the table are able to fit through the Panama
Canal although many of them do not actually transit the canal.
The increasing vessel sizes place a number of constraints on
containerized liner service systems. Additional investments are
required to acquire new and larger vessels and containers, improve
and enlarge port facilities, purchase new container cranes and other
handling equipment, and improve the sea/overland transportation
interface. The large vessel sizes create more inflexibility in how
these container vessels are used. The number of trade routes where
these vessels can call are limited by available cargo volumes and
length of route. Additionally, many ports cannot be used due to
channel, pier, and container crane constraints. The new APL ships
described earlier are not only confined to the Pacific but are able to
call at only eight ports throughout their area of service.27 As a result,
increased reliance must be placed on feeder services to the load
center ports, either via smaller containerships or overland modes.
These feeder services are an important consideration in the function
ing of intermodal and round-the-world liner services previously
described.
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Overcapacity
The escalating sizes of vessels, particularly for containerships
discussed in the previous section, have helped to create an oversup
ply of shipping service in the liner trades. In the world general cargo
and unitized fleets, which include container, break-bulk, and other
types of vessels, the overcapacity in deadweight was on the order of
six percent.28 This represented a decline for the general cargo fleet
and the same level for the unitized fleet when compared with the
early to mid I970's. Since a relatively large percentage of break-bulk
and containerized cargoes are of low density, deadweight may not
be a good measure for evaluating overcapacity.
A previous paper reported estimates of containership overcapac
ity in the Trans-Pacific and Trans-Atlantic container trades, with
overall load factors for TEU of seventy-six and seventy percent
respectively in 1986, representing declines from 1983 figures.29 A
more recent report estimates that the load factors in both trades are
nearly the same or worse in the 1986-87 time period, being ap
proximately seventy percent for both trades, as found in Table 4.30
The Europe/Far East container trades are estimated to have a higher
load factor of about eighty-three percent. This data indicates that
not only is the overcapacity problem persisting but it is somewhat
growing worse, at least for the U.S. containerized liner trades.
The worsening overcapacity problem in the U.S. liner trades
creates a number of difficulties for shipping lines. One of these is
increased competition among the lines in these trades, even when
conferences are found on a particular trade route. Since confer
ences in the U.S. liner trades are required to be open, a shipping
line can withdraw from the conference if constrained too much
knowing that it can easily rejoin the conference if it desires. As a
result, downward pressure is often exerted on the rates by inde
pendent liner operators and the threat of conference members to
become independents.
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TABLE 3
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF LARGE CONTAINERSHIPS

Sea-land
Characteristic

Atlantic’

Evergreen

APL
C-9

C-10

G-Class

New

Length, ft.

950

860

903

750

N/A

Beam, ft.

106

106

129.2

105.6

N/A

Draft, ft.

29.5

35

41

32

N/A

Speed, knots

19.1

25

24.2

19.5

N/A

2,500

4,300

2,728

4,000

Capacity, TEUb

3,400

^Former New York class vessels of U.S. Lines; vessel TEU capacity downsized
from 4,482.
bTEU = twenty-foot equivilent units.
Sources: Marine Engineering/Log, Containerisation International, American
Shipper.

This inability to implement or sustain rate increases is exactly
what has often happened in the U.S. liner trades.31 Liner shipping
rates of the U.S. Atlantic/Northern Europe Conference declined
approximately fourteen percent between 1984 and 1986. The
twenty-five percent decline of liner freight rates to parts of Europe
between 1985 and 1987, including both U.S. and non-U.S. trades, is
a further indication of this downward rate pressure. Liner rates in
the eastbound Trans-Pacific trades are estimated to have declined by
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ten percent or more during 1988. As a result, a number of confer
ences and shipping lines have found it difficult to increase operating
revenues, even in the face of escalating operating costs and the need
to purchase additional vessels and equipment to remain competitive.
Another issue facing shipping lines due to overcapacity is the use
of rebates, where a shipping line makes payments to customers who
use their liner service. This effectively reduces the transportation
rate charged below that filed in the legal tariff. Although rebating is
a common practice in the world liner trades, Federal law prohibits
such actions by shipping lines in the U.S. international liner trades.
Previous enforcement action was undertaken by the FMC in the
Trans-Atlantic trades and similar action is now underway in the

TABLE 4
SELECTED CHARACTERISTRICS OF LARGE CONTAINERSHIPS

Trade Route

Estimated
Annual
Cargo
TEU, mm's

Estimated
Annual
Capacity
TEU, mm's

Load Factor
(Percent)

Trans-Pacific

4.4

6.3

70%

Trans-Atlantic

2.8

4.0

70%

Europe/Far East

2.0

2.4

83%

Sources: Adapted from Review of Maritime Transport 1987.
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Trans-Pacific trades.32 One line was recently fined $2.5 million and
further enforcement action is expected. Liner firms find it difficult to
resist using rebates to encourage cargo bookings given the current
overcapacity, but the rebates are illegal nonetheless.
The current overcapacity has thus created financial difficulties
for some shipping lines, both foreign and U.S.33 As an example, U.S.
Lines had to declare Chapter 11 bankruptcy in late 1986 because of
difficulties with its RTW service and will apparently not recover from
this situation. Not only were the 11 rates too low and vessel
capacity too large, but U.S. Lines was not carrying enough high rated
cargo. Lykes Line and Hapag-Lloyd also withdrew from the Trans
pacific trades while Showa Line of Japan withdrew in early 1988
from nearly all liner trades including the Trans-Pacific. Financial
difficulties are also being experienced on other trade routes due to
the overcapacity problem.

ANALYSIS
The environment for liner shipping in the U.S. international
trades today is one that potentially creates both problems and
opportunities for all concerned. Whether a firm is a shipping line,
shipper, consignee, or intermediary, its operations have been
affected. The reaction to the current environment and the anticipa
tion of the future environment will help to determine a firm's success
or failure. The following sections examine the impacts on and
reactions of shipping lines and their customers.

Shipping Line Effects
The effects of the environment on liner shipping are numerous.
The Shipping Act of 1984 determines to some extent the nature and
scope of these effects. The three principal components of intermodal authority, mandatory independent action, and service contracts
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discussed earlier have resulted in changes in the industry that have,
in some cases, worsened the effects of the current overcapacity
problem. Mandatory independent action and service contracts, in
particular, have been used by individual shipping lines to lower the
rates charged for international liner transportation. As a result,
shipping line profitability has eroded for many lines since lower rates
don't always result in increased total revenue and/or profitability.
A number of surveys and meetings evaluating the Shipping Act
have taken place since its implementation nearly five years ago.34
These have found major disagreements between how shipping lines
view the Act as compared to shippers (covered below). Shipping
lines appear to have the most concerns about the mandatory
independent action for conferences required by the Act, which has
generally led to a depressed level of rates. Shipping lines have also
expressed reservations about service contracts, which have often
resulted in lower rates than might otherwise have been obtained.
Shipping lines, however, have positive views about other
portions of the Act as well. Principal among these are the stream
lined process to implement new rates and services, increased anti
trust immunity, and the ability to offer intermodal rates and services.
This last view is reinforced by the large growth in intermodal services
since the passage of the Act in 1984. Overall, the overcapacity that
exists in the liner trades accounts to some degree for the carrier
dissatisfaction. In a market with a better balance between supply
and demand, there would be much less pressure to lower rates
through independent action or service contracts.
The liner conferences and individual lines in the U.S. trades
have instituted actions to address the overcapacity issue and its
impacts. Although overcapacity affects most liner trades in the
world, it appears to be more acute in the U.S. trades because of the
size of the gap between supply of capacity and cargo available. One
way in which this situation can be addressed is for liner conferences
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to rationalize (reduce) service among their members in order to
decrease total capacity. For example, conference and independent
shipping lines in the trans-Pacific trades have recently agreed to cut
eastbound container capacity.35 The result of this rationalization
may be the increase of shipping rates in both directions on the trans
pacific trades and reduced numbers of independent actions by
individual lines.
Another strategy to cope with overcapacity has been to form
joint services through what are known as space charters. These
services use the ships of one or more lines, with space on each
vessel allocated to two or more shipping lines, even though the
vessel may be operated by a single liner firm. A space charter
agreement allows two or more lines to participate on a liner route
without each line having to operate its own vessels, thus easing the
overcapacity situation. Space charters have been concluded, among
others, by Sea-Land with Nedlloyd and Trans Freight Lines and
Atlantic Container Line with Wilhelmsen and Hapag-Lloyd in the
trans-Atlantic trades, and Barber Blue Sea with Norwegian Special
ized Auto Carriers in the trans-Pacific trades.36 Another possibility is
the merger of shipping lines in order to create a more efficient
carrier, such as the proposed merger of Lykes with Farrell Lines.37
The continued evolution of liner service appears to be toward a
greater offering of intermodal service, as opposed to more traditional
liner service or RTW service. Although RTW service has expanded
somewhat, the bankruptcy of U.S. Lines removed a major competi
tor from this market. Evergreen has enjoyed success in this segment
of international liner shipping but few other lines have implemented
similar services. Traditional liner services, which handle break-bulk
or general cargo, are still quite viable in the less developed U.S.
international trades such as those with much of Africa. The liner
trades between industrialized nations will probably be dominated
even more by container and intermodal shipping in the years to
come.
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Intermodal service, as discussed previously, has grown dramati
cally. Part of this is undoubtedly due to the freedom granted by the
Shipping Act of 1984 for conferences to offer such service. These
services have expanded to include multiple overland modes, the
stack-trains described earlier, domestic transportation service, and
well-developed computer information systems to support intermodalism and are now marketed as a value-added service.38 The stacktrain services, through their expansion to domestic transportation,
are apparently beginning to replace the trailer on flat car (TOFC)
intermodal services offered by U.S. railroads. More and more ship
ping lines are expanding the scope of intermodal service they can
directly offer, as is found with APL and Evergreen. Sea-Land has
taken this one step further since, through their ownership by CSX,
they are often able to offer a complete intermodal movement for
which CSX has complete responsibility.

Shipping Line Customer Effects
As with the shipping lines, shippers have also been dramatically
affected by the Shipping Act of 1984. In the case of shippers, the
effects of the Act have, for the most part, been quite positive.39
While shipping lines find independent action and service contracts a
barrier to achieving financial success, just the opposite is true of
shippers primarily because rate reductions through both means have
been quite prevalent in recent years. Not all shippers have necessar
ily benefited as a result of service contracts and independent action,
since some are not large enough to enjoy the deepest rate reduc
tions.
There have been a number of specific benefits enjoyed by
shippers in addition to the reduced transportation costs resulting
from reduced rate levels. Among these benefits are increased
intermodal services, faster transit times, more sailings, and greater
choices between the origin/destination gateways used.40 Many of
these benefits have resulted from the increased intermodal services
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since these services must emphasize speed, frequency, reliability,
and geographic scope of coverage in order to attract shipper cargo.
Thus, there have been a range of benefits to shippers as a result of
the Shipping Act.
The overcapacity in international liner shipping today has
generally benefitted shippers who use these services. Overcapacity,
with the resulting pressure to decrease rates, has allowed shippers
the opportunity to negotiate favorable shipping rates. This has been
done through service contracts or through conference rate levels and
independent action on the part of individual shipping lines. Concur
rently, shipping lines have had to be responsive to the full range of
needs of shippers, thus enabling many shippers to receive higher
levels of service. The lower levels of rates have created some
uncertainties with regard to the availability of particular shipping
services when a line drops a particular service.41
The range of liner service available to shippers today is much
greater than it was only a few years ago. Shippers can now choose
among traditional break-bulk, containerized, RTW, and intermodal
services. In order to make these choices, however, a shipper needs
to better understand the transportation decision environment. Thus,
to make a good decision about what carrier and service to use, the
shipper may have to make a total cost analysis of the transportation
alternatives. For a high value or perishable cargo, a reliable intermo
dal service can potentially offer the lowest total logistics cost,42 even
though the transportation cost may be higher than other liner
alternatives. A shipper of lower value non-perishable goods,
however, might be better to choose a more traditional, container
ized, or RTW liner service offering lower transportation and total
logistics cost.
Although an intermodal service may offer a higher level of
service, it does have some potential drawbacks for a shipper. One
of these is that the shipper will no longer have control over the
selection of individual overland carriers. The intermodal shipping
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line will, in most cases, have already selected the inland carriers to
use for its intermodal service. The heavy reliance on rail transporta
tion could lead to increased loss and damage when compared with
the use of a highway carrier for overland transportation. These
considerations will often be outweighed by the advantages to
intermodal shipping.
Other types of liner service also have potential drawbacks as
well. The non-intermodal services require a shipper to make a
wider range of transportation decisions regarding type of service to
use, which carriers to select, how to ensure efficient cargo transfer
from one carrier to another, and what routes to use. Additionally,
the amount of documentation will generally be much greater for the
non-intermodal services. For shippers who are not well versed in
international transportation, intermodal service offers a way to ship
cargo internationally without having to necessarily acquire the
expertise in-house. Thus, intermodal liner service can be advanta
geous to not only shippers of high value cargo but to others as well.

CONCLUSIONS
The dynamic environment both within and outside liner
shipping in the U.S. international trades has caused many changes.
Regulatory changes have created an environment of greater compe
tition in liner shipping. The Shipping Act of 1984 with its provisions
for intermodal service, independent action, and service contracts,
created stronger competition. Recent rulings or pending actions by
the FMC may, however, reduce carrier pricing flexibility with
resulting rate increases. The outcome of a formal review of the Act
will take place during 1989, and the implementation of any subse
quent recommendations cannot be determined at the present time.
Likewise, the actual role of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness
Act of 1988 in liner shipping has yet to be fully determined.
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In spite of the uncertainties, the current overcapacity in the
industry will probably continue to exert downward pressure on
rates. The increasing vessel and fleet sizes will continue to contrib
ute to this overcapacity. Current efforts in the industry to rationalize
liner service through space charters, mergers, and capacity restric
tions should relieve some of the pressure. The capacity reductions
in the industry will probably not be sufficient to alleviate the situ
ation in the near term. As a result, rate increases may be difficult to
sustain and practices such as below tariff rates and rebating may be
difficult to completely eliminate in the U.S. international trades.
The competitive environment has also witnessed a growth in the
types of international liner service available. Intermodalism has
grown rapidly and can be expected to continue to expand, although
the growth rate will slow at some point in the future. RTW services
appear to have stabilized in size and market impact and can be ex
pected to remain stable without major environmental changes.
Containerized shipping, be it via intermodal, RTW, or traditional
liner service will continue to dominate the trades w'ith developed
nations. Traditional break-bulk liner services appear to be confined
primarily to the trades with less-developed nations where the
overland transportation infrastructure is more rudimentary.
The current difficulties with the level of rates and the wide range
of liner services available has created a real need for more efficient
and effective management. Shipping lines require management that
is able to cope with an environment of overcapacity and reduced
rate levels. Management must also be in a position to make effective
decisions regarding the competing needs to reduce overcapacity yet
at the same time purchase new' vessels and equipment to maintain a
competitive edge. This tradeoff is especially critical for intermodal
lines, where the current technological lead on competition may not
last very long.
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Likewise, shippers, consignees, and intermediaries require
effective management. Although lower rates are generally an
advantage to shipping line customers, decisions are still required in a
number of areas. The wide range of services available and the
potential flexibility in rates means that a firm must do a careful
analysis to determine the best shipping alternative. This analysis
must not only include the ocean transportation cost incurred but
also other transportation and logistics costs. Thus, the changing en
vironment is a challenge to both shipping lines and their customers.
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